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The analogue in international politics is the three-party conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
quagmire in which first Europe and then the entire world have become stuck. The complexity
of the problem reflects not only the intensity of the hatreds that have been fanned between the
parties and must now be accounted for in any solution, but that two of the primary parties have
immediate support in neighboring countries that also have their own bilateral problems to resolve;
furthermore, each of these actors has, for historical or other motives, its own important patrons
among the leading powers of the world.
THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
Svetozar Stojanovic*
I. A NON-SYNCHRONIZED AND CONTRADICTORY STATE
From its formation in 1918, Yugoslavia was a non-synchronized
and contradictory state. It was created mainly by Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, countries that were victors in the First World War. The
Serbian nation's human and material sacrifice invested in Yugo-
slavia was unparalleled. Serbs were convinced that they could
best solve their national question in a broader Southern Slav
framework. Besides, a broader state framework was necessary to
fulfil the ambitions of the Serbian royal family and the victorious
army, as well as the ambitions of Serbian political and other
elites.
The other two then-recognized state-constitutive nations,
Croats and Slovens, also entered Yugoslavia voluntarily, but from
a different, vanquished state, Austria-Hungary. 1 By doing so,
these nations joined the winning side in the War and saved some
territories towards which Italy and Austria aspired. Unlike the
Serbs, however, a large number of Croats immediately expressed
dissatisfaction at the common state and demonstrated a virtually
obsessive aspiration for an independent state. This sentiment
was particularly strong as Yugoslavia was a unitary and not a fed-
eral state.
There can be no doubt that because of their number (al-
most forty percent), strength, the fact that they were spread
throughout almost the entire country, and their inclination to-
ward state-protection, the Serbian people were, and remained
until the end, the main "impediment"2 to the break-up of Yugo-
slavia. The other Yugoslav separatist movements, at first weak
but recently very strong, were also inherently anti-Serb-oriented.
Nonetheless, it is erroneous to think that there did not exist
close mutual similarities, links, and Other good reasons for the
* Director, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrde, Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia; Distinguished Visiting Professor, Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies and Philosophy, University of Kansas; Former Advisor to Former President
Dobrica Cosic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mid 1992-mid 1993. When Cosic
was removed by Slobodan Milogevie, Stojanovic immediately resigned.
1. The Serbs living in Austria-Hungary likewise joined the new Yugoslav state.
2. "Impediment" is an anti-Serb expression used by Croat separatists.
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unification of the Southern Slav peoples. One such reason was
identical, or very like, ethnic origin. In addition, the marked
majority of the population shared a common language, Serbo-
Croatian, and the two other main languages, Slovene and Mace-
donian (the latter officially codified only after the Second World
War), are very close to that majority language. It was on this
basis that close cultural links were founded. The Yugoslav ideol-
ogists of the time, however, went to such extremes in their en-
thusiasm for the new state that they proclaimed that Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes were three tribes of the same nation,
although it was already a question of three separate nations
forming one unified state. The Montenegrins and the Serbs
from Serbia wanted to help their Southern Slav brothers, and
particularly the Serbs who lived in those territories, to free them
from Austria-Hungary. In any case, a larger state offered far bet-
ter protection for security and border integrity: of the seven
original Yugoslav borders, at least five have been brought into
question since 1918, including those with Italy, Austria, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Albania. Many inter-national marriages also
helped to form a connective tissue for both Yugoslavias (interwar
and post-World War II), and such marriages numbered over one
million at the end of the 1980's. Finally, the highly complemen-
tary nature of the economies in the region, as well as the advan-
tages offered by a larger market, should be recalled.
This does not, of course, mean in any way that violence did
not play a huge role in the creation, maintenance, destruction,
and renewal of Yugoslavia in the years 1941 to 1945. Let us start
from the fact that Serbian military power did, in a certain sense,
carry out unification over the "barrel of a gun," as many Croats
and Slovenes had taken part in the war against Serbia and Mon-
tenegro on the side of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, King
Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic3 : suspended Yugoslavia's multiparty
parliament in 1929 and introduced a personal dictatorship in
order to save Yugoslavia from breaking up. Unfortunately, it was
held together more by military, police, political, and administra-
tive power than by economic, religious, cultural, and civiliza-
tional links.
3. King Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic was born in 1888. He was assassinated, to-
gether with the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou, in 1934 in Marseilles by Mace-
donian and Croat terrorists-separatists.
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In both Yugoslavias state integration was stronger than social
integration. Capitalism was not well-developed in the first Yugo-
slavia, particularly in the central and eastern part of the country.
Its western regions were considerably more economically pro-
gressive, while Serbia dominated the military, political, and ad-
ministrative spheres. Contrary to the broadly accepted idea of
the tradition of democracy in the western areas of the country,
only Serbia in the east entered Yugoslavia with a democratic-state
inheritance. In the first twenty-three years of Yugoslavia's exist-
ence, Serbia and Montenegro did not really succeed in reducing
the economic gap, nor in transforming their non-economic he-
gemony into an economic one. This was hardly surprising, how-
ever, as both Serbia and Montenegro had suffered irreparable
human and material losses in the two Balkan wars in 1913-14
and in the First World War.4
Yugoslavia was renewed by the communists victors in the
Second World War. Two important facts from the history of vio-
lence in the communist Yugoslavia should be noted: (1) Tito
concluded that the Croat national and nationalistic movement
in 1970-71 threatened Yugoslavia to such an extent that it had to
be crushed by repressive means; and (2) the Albanian separatist
movement in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo had been
repelled by force several times since 1944-45 - indeed, the situ-
ation remains the same today in post-communist Yugoslavia.
The tenacity and acuteness with which the national question
continued to renew itself in Yugoslavia for over seven decades is
actually understandable. Yugoslavia emerged, disappeared, and
rose again in two world wars, and as such, on the territory of
Yugoslavia, those wars were marked by inter-national, inter-reli-
gious, civil, fratricidal, and even genocidal conflicts.
Although it is my opinion that ' internal factors were more
important than external ones for the final disintegration of Yu-
goslavia, this does not in any way suggest that we should underes-
timate the role of foreign factors in the creation, maintenance,
renewal, and break-up of the two Yugoslavias. First and fore-
most, Yugoslavia was created with the decisive support of France,
the United States, and Great Britain, the three western allies of
4. In those wars, 1.2 million people died, or approximately one-quarter of the en-
tire population of about 4.8 million. Of course, that figure includes total losses, includ-
ing those caused by mass epidemics.
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Serbia and Montenegro in the First World War, and it was occu-
pied and dismembered in 1941 by Germany (and Austria, which
had been annexed to it), Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Yugosla-
via was renewed in 1945 with the support of the Soviet Union
and the same three western allies. Throughout Yugoslavia's entire
history much has depended on whether the decisive foreign countries have
aggrevated Yugoslavia's contradictions or promoted its cohesion.
As a factor of state integration, the initial enthusiasm of the
Yugoslav communists was combined with the suppression of the
national question by means of education, propaganda, and
force. According to that ideology, "the new Yugoslav society" was
in the national sense essentially a society without conflict. When
it was not possible to deny some evident inter-national problem,
it was claimed that the problem was in no way a consequence of
the new communist system, but only a "remnant of the old soci-
ety" or a consequence of "counter-revolutionary activity." The
Yugoslav communists believed that remaining silent about what
had happened among the Yugoslav nations during the Second
World War would truly contribute to the recovery and promo-
tion of relations between them.
If my statement about the first Yugoslavia being in many
ways a non-synchronized and contradictory state is correct, what
then can be said about the second Yugoslavia that endeavored,
by keeping silent, to fill in the fatal fissure opened in Jasenovac
and other places of annihilation of Serbs in the so-called In-
dependent State of Croatia during the Second World War?5
The communist victors in Yugoslavia never seriously ex-
amined the Ustashi genocide as an issue or a problem. Instead
of carrying out denazification through enlightened education,
they limited themselves to the liquidation of captured Ustashis.6
5. On April 6, 1941, Yugoslavia was attacked by Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy,
and their allies surrounding Yugoslavia. As early as April 10, 1941, a puppet state, the
Independent State of Croatia, comprising the Yugoslav regions of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, was established under the leadership of Ante Pavelie and his terrorist-
separatist organization of Ustashis, who returned from their exile abroad. The Ustashis
conducted the policy of genocide and, according to German military archives, killed
between 350,000 and 700,000 Serbs, 50,000 Jews, and 20,000 Gypsies. When Hitler at-
tacked the Soviet Union in 1941, Pavelie declared war and sent troops to fight against
the Soviets. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he declared war on the United States and
Great Britain.
6. It is true that Pavelie and the other main Ustashi war criminals had fled abroad,
and that although they more than deserved it, the new authorities did not endeavor to
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The karst pits into which Serbs were thrown alive by Ustashis in
Bosnia-Herzegovina remained concreted over, and their rela-
tives were not allowed to remove the bodies and bury them until
1991. These "concreted pits" have become a metaphor for the
communist illusion that enforced silence is the best way to deal
with terrible crimes among nations. Perhaps that was one rea-
son, in addition to his personal nonchalance, that Tito never vis-
ited Jasenovac.
With the wholehearted support of the other communists -
mainly Serbs - and in the name of "internationalism," the lead-
ing Croat communists did not even attempt to initiate a discus-
sion on Ustashi genocide. Instead, they took as their guide the
comfortable ideological premise that their contribution to the
Peoples Liberation Struggle, as Tito's partisans called their strug-
gle from 1941 to 1945, had expressed the essence of Croat tradi-
tion, while the Ustashi movement was nothing more than an acci-
dent in that tradition. Thus, communist totalitarianism "solved"
one of the most acute problems of the renewed Yugoslavia in
one monopolistic-essentialistic move. The genocide perpetrated
against Serbs (as well as against Jews and Gypsies) was relativized
and placed under the general category of "war crimes commit-
ted by the occupiers and their henchmen." As communist offi-
cialdom did not define the Ustashi movement as a kind of Na-
zism, which it doubtlessly was, no official denazification process
was implemented like the process organized and carried out in
Germany.
II. FROM THE PARALIZATION TO THE BREAKING-UP OF
THE STATE
Many scholars divide Yugoslavia's post-World War II devel-
opment into the period before and the period after the adop-
tion of the 1974 Constitution. For me, the key moment came
with the death of the charismatic Josip Broz Tito in 1980. In-
deed, it is my belief that the Constitution failed to create a true
federation.
For the entire post-war period a small group under Tito's
absolute domination made all important decisions for the whole
of Yugoslavia, which its executive bodies in the Republics and
organize a trial, (in absentia), like that which took place in Nfirnberg following World
War II.
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Autonomous Provinces implemented in a disciplined manner.
In 1945 that same group made the original decision on the for-
mation of federal units and determined the "borders" between
them. The multi-national composition of that group does not
justify consideration of the Yugoslavia of that period as a truly
federally organized state. It was a centralized, communist party-
state only posing as a federation.
Following the constitutional changes introduced in the first
half of the 1970's, the State order was formally so decentralized
that each Republic and Autonomous Province gained the right
to block the passage of important decisions on the federal level.
Thus Yugoslavia was, according to the Constitution of 1974,
transformed into a confused, contradictory, and even self-destructive
mixture of federation and confederation. Right up to Tito's death,
however, our federalism-confederalism remained more apparent
than real, as the "unmoved mover" could always, through his in-
tervention, put an end to paralysis by imposing decisions. Usu-
ally, Tito would dictate a "consensus" to the discordant republi-
can and provincial authorities. Thanks to this, the impression
was gained that the constitutional system was functioning, while
in fact it was only an autocrat that was functioning.
But what throughout the 1970's remained a constitutional
decoration for Tito's autocracy became after his death a real sys-
tem of decision-making that quickly succumbed to complete pa-
ralysis. This was due, among other things, to the hypertrophied
principle of consent on the part of the federal units, and to their
ability to prevent by veto the passage of practically all federal
decisions that did not suit them.
At that time, a number of means were available by which the
Republics and Autonomous. Provinces were protected against
outvoting on the federal level. First, the parity representation of
the federal units regardless of.population size. Second, their
representatives had virtually only an imperative mandate. Third,
the essentially unlimited right of veto enjoyed by the federal
units and even the requirement of their active agreement for
decision-making. Fourth, there were no constitutional means by
which to change anything in the Constitution unless the repub-
lics and provinces voted unanimously.
After Tito's death, national and nationalistic aspirations
openly characterized not only state, but also Communist Party
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bodies. This cluster of national and nationalistic communisms was
already in many ways a proto-multiparty system. Before the mul-
tiparty elections and referendums in the Republics in 1990 some
communist functionaries were carried away with "the preserva-
tion of Tito's name and achievements." Others, however, had
concluded that he was dead for once and for all and that they
had to search for new strongholds in their national milieux. In
this way the national-communists markedly outweighed the
Yugo-communists. Moreover, there developed competition
among the former as to who would demonstrate the most radical
nationalism and separatism. The national-communists, of
course, presented their policies as evidence of their liberalism,
their democracy, and even their anti-communism.
At the end of the Second World War the united Communist
Party of Yugoslavia ("CPY') recreated Yugoslavia as a very cen-
tralized state under the name of a federation. For a long time,
in fact, the CPY had attacked the centralism of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (1918-41) and incited national-separatist passions in
an effort to destroy it. Although the CPY was a rather marginal
force right up to Germany's attack on Yugoslavia and the USSR
in 1941, it had nonetheless contributed considerably to the crea-
tion of those inter-national relations that were to cause so much
trouble in the fratricidal war of 1941-45.
At the end of 1990 the fragmented CPY disintegrated when
the Slovene delegation, headed by Milan Kucan,7 left its Con-
gress. The other republican delegations did not support the de-
mand of the Serbian delegation, which was already dominated to
a large degree by the arrogant Slobodan Milogevi ,8 that the
Congress should continue as if nothing important had hap-
pened. Thus, the Congress was "adjourned," spelling out the
end of the CPY.
III. WARS BET WFN SECESSIONISTS AND ANTI-
SECESSIONISTS
In the second half of the 1980's, it appeared that the Croat-
7. At the time, Milan Kucan was Chairman of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of Slovenia, one of the republican organizations of the CPY. When Slove-
nia separated from Yugeslavia in 1991, he became and still is, President of that country.
8. At the time, Slobodan Milogevie was Chairman of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Serbia, one of the republican organizations of the CPY. In 1989,
he became and still is, President of Serbia.
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Serb conflict was being pushed aside from the central place in
the history of Yugoslavia by the conflict between the Slovenes
and the Serbs. The great majority of the Slovene nation sup-
ported Slovenia's endeavor to secede from Yugoslavia, and im-
mediately so, regardless of the consequences for the other na-
tions. The newly-elected multiparty Slovenian parliament passed
a declaration on independence on July 25, 1991. The Yugoslav
authorities responded to this with military intervention, having a
limited purpose, dimension, and resoluteness. The aim was the
reestablishment of federal control on Slovenia's proclaimed in-
ternational borders. Frightened by a potential conflict with the
Yugoslav Army ("YA"), the Slovenian Government agreed to a
suggestion from European Community envoys to suspend seces-
sionist steps provisionally. The Slovenian Government did not,
however, fulfill the obligations undertaken as part of that agree-
ment. The "international community" did not react, and, more
importantly, the Yugoslav authorities and YA soon decided to
give in to Slovenia. This was primarily because Slovenia's seces-
sion, taken in isolation from other factors, did not appear to rep-
resent a threat of igniting catastrophic wars, as Slovenia was a
rather homogeneous national entity. To put it simply, the
Slovenes did not have an analogous problem to the problem ex-
isting between the Croats and the Serbs.
The relationship between Croats and Serbs had been of cru-
cial importance for Yugoslavia from the time the country had
come into being. In that respect, Jasenovac, which for me is a
metaphor for overall Ustashi genocide as well, was the criminal
culmination of the rift between these two nations, a rift that was
covered by silence and repression. It is true that the volcano
threatened to erupt again when the Croats' national and nation-
alistic movement broke out in 1970 and 1971, reviving the mass
fears of the Serbs. Tito "handled" that crisis, however, like he
had handled others - with force. For nearly the next twenty
years Croat nationalism and separatism were to struggle along in
hiding, waiting for a new opportunity.
When Croat nationalism and separatism came to the fore
again in 1990-91, this time with incomparably greater force, the
Jasenovac fissure deepened and widened, ultimately, into the vio-
lent break-up not only of Yugoslavia, but also of Croatia itself,
and, somewhat later, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This fissure caused
a war of the Serbs for separation from Croatia and a war of the
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Croats to prevent them from doing so. In a certain sense, then,
the roles changed: the initial separatists became anti-separatists,
and the original anti-separatists became separatists.
As soon as it came to power in 1991, the Croat Democratic
Community ("CDC"), under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman,9
annulled by means of a new Constitution of Croatia the constitu-
tive-republican status of the Serbs in Croatia, which they had
won for themselves in the Second World War and had enjoyed
under the communists. The new authorities assigned the role of
a national minority to those Serbs, but they rejected this develop-
ment, citing as reasons not only the status they had hitherto en-
joyed, but also the fact that, despite the Croats' right of veto in
Yugoslavia, Croatia wanted to become a separate state at all costs.
Croatia decided to retain only the republican "borders" deline-
ated in the communist Constitution. For that reason, the former
intermediator of the "international community" in Yugoslav con-
flicts, Lord Carrington, has repeatedly stated that with its new
Constitution, Croatia rekindled the conflict with the Serbs. The
Serbs then decided in a referendum to secede from Croatia and
to form the Serb Republic of Krajina 10 ("SRK"), in just the same
way that Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia.
The new Croat authorities did many other things to alienate
the Serbs radically: (1) they adopted a state symbol reminiscent
of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (the more precise
name would have been the Nazi State of Croatia); (2) they
changed the names of places, institutions, and streets in the
spirit of nationalistic, even Ustashi, tradition; (3) they officially
tolerated and even encouraged acts of job dismissal and expul-
sion of Serbs from Croatia ("ethnic cleansing"); (4) they endeav-
ored to change the national composition of the police by force
in regions of Croatia where Serbs made up the majority; and (5)
preparations were made for the physical liquidation of the Serbs,
an objective that was secretly planned by Defense Minister of
9. Franjo Tudjman was Tito's partisan between 1941 and 1945. After the war he
became a general in the YA. In 1970-71, he was one of the leaders of the national and
nationalistic mass movement in Croatia. After Tito crushed that movement, Tudjman
was imprisoned. In 1990 he organized and led a separatist political party that brought
about the independent Republic of Croatia in 1991, of which Tudjman has been Presi-
dent ever since.
10. In 1995, Croatia attacked and, for all practical purposes, liquidated the SRK.
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Croatia, General Martin Spegelj and then secretly filmed and
made public by YA intelligence.
Serb resistance passed through two phases. The first was led
by the very moderate President of the newly-formed Serb Demo-
cratic Party ("SDP"), the late ProfessorJovan Raskovic, who had
been educated in Croatia and had worked and lived there with
his wife, a Croat, and their children. Then, as the Serbs were not
offered even minimal autonomy, but only a unitary Croatia, they
determined to establish the SRK by force with the help of Serbia
and the YA, and unfortunately moderate men such as Raskovic
were pushed aside.
The fissure between the Muslims and the Serbs, long sup-
pressed and concealed under a layer of civilized behavior,
opened up to its full width and depth as soon as Bosnian Mus-
lims expressed their intention to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina
from Yugoslavia. Namely, a not-so-small member of Bosnian
Muslims assisted the Ustashi authorities and even actively partici-
pated in their genocidal crimes perpetrated on Serbs.11
When, at the beginning of the 1990's, Yugoslavia began to
disintegrate, it was completely unrealistic to expect that such a
"statequake" would halt at the "borders" of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It should, after all, have been expected that Serbia and Montene-
gro would assist the Serbs in that Yugoslav Republic no less ar-
dently than those in Croatia.' It was also already visible that Bos-
nian Serbs were successfully drawing entire units, armaments,
and equipment from divisions of the Serb-dominated YA that
had previously been stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina or had
withdrawn into it from Slovenia and Croatia. This development,
among others, explains why the Serbs entered into the conflict
with the Muslims with a large military advantage.
In 1945, the communists did not grant Bosnia-Herzegovina
a republican status within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
11. While on the subject of the unhappy history of Muslim-Serb relations, it must
also be acknowledged that a number of Serbian Royalist Chetnik units killed not a small
number of innocent Muslims during the Second World War in retaliation for those
Muslim acts during the war. Further, throughout the long Turkish occupation, Mus-
lims were a privileged and ruling population that treated Serbs (and Croats) as Chris-
tian Turkish subjects without any rights whatsoever. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin
gave those territories to Austria-Hungary, which formally annexed them thirty years
later. That act was to arouse the anger of the Serbs, culminating in the assassination of
the archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, and setting into motion a
series of reactions and counter-reactions that led to the First World War.
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slavia ("SFRY') for it to be dominated by Muslims, but rather in
order to avoid a conflict between Serbs and Croats over this terri-
tory and the national identity of the Muslims ("Serbs of Muslim
faith or Croats of Muslim faith?"). Yugoslav communist rulers
knew well that a political balance had to be maintained in that
republic among the three national groups. Of course, consen-
sus, as a form of decision-making in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not
have a democratic character. Rather, consensus involved only
agreement of the national communist oligarchies.
As soon as multiparty organization was allowed, at the be-
ginning of the 1990's, the huge majority of Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina formed different political parties.
These were, in fact, three mass national and nationalistic move-
ments. These groups won at the elections and formed a new
government that continued to function for a time according to
the principle of the consensus among the three national repre-
sentations.
When Slovenia and Croatia made it known they were seced-
ing from Yugoslavia, however, the Muslims found themselves
faced with a grave dilemma: to remain part of Yugoslavia despite
the fears of possible Serb domination or to try to separate Bos-
nia-Herzegovina as a whole with the help of the Croats, the Mus-
lim world, and the "international community" in general. As a
demographic projection indicated a forthcoming majority over
Serbs and Croats taken together, the Muslims decided, by a huge
majority, on the latter course of action.
The first large-scale battles for mutual territorial demarca-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted, in fact, between Croats and
Serbs, in Herzegovina and the Sava valley. The newly-created
Croat-Muslim alliance was, however, only temporary in charac-
ter. It is surprising that the Muslim leaders relied on the Croat
alliance to the extent they did, since they were aware that many
Croats considered them only religiously islamized members of
their own nation.12 The primary objectives for the leaders of the
Bosnian Croats and their supporters in Croatia were to break up
Yugoslavia as much as possible with the help of Muslims; to cut
off the Serbs west of the Drina River from Serbia and Montene-
gro; and to cut off the SRK from the newly-proclaimed Serb Re-
12. After all, that is the way they were officially treated in Pavelit's so-called In-
dependent State of Croatia.
19951
348 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:337
public ("SR") in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Serbs there es-
tablished after Muslims and Croats separated Bosnia-Herzego-
vina from Yugoslavia. After these goals were attained, they
would attend to the separation of the territory they call Herzeg
Bosnia from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and perhaps subordinate the
Muslim part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia.
There is one thing about which there can be no doubt: in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, no less than in Croatia, it is a question of
fratricidal wars in the literal sense of the word. The official uni-
tarian ideology of the first Yugoslavia was based on the assump-
tion of "one nation consisting of three tribes." This concept was
not quite erroneous, as Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes do originate
from the same people - Southern Slavs. This is also true of the
Slav Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were first recognized
by atheist communists as a separate nation primarily defined by
religion.
In the fratricidal war in Yugoslavia, Muslims have, to date,
fared the worst. Their losses deserve great regret and sorrow, as
indeed do the losses of the other two national groups. Nonethe-
less, such losses do not give Muslims the right to cast the blame
on others completely, nor the right to refuse to recognize the
catastrophic mistakes that their leadership has made and that
they themselves have made when they supported their leader-
ship en masse.
Of course, each side, secessionist and anti-secessionist, ex-
ploited the possibilities of a Yugoslav combination of federalism
and confederalism in conflicting ways. If the Serbs had really
dominated Yugoslavia, as Sloven, Croat, Muslim, and Macedo-
nian separatists claim, then the secession of these groups from
Yugoslavia would have been thwarted. On the other hand, if Yu-
goslavia had been a confederation only, as their Serb opponents
bemoan, then those republics would have seceded more easily
and even taken with- them the Serbs west of the Drina. In any
case, the greater part of the YA would not have passed so quickly
into the control of Serbia and Montenegro.
As it has turned out, the Serb question in some sense
proved more fateful than the Croat question, both in the context
of the creation and seventy-year-survival of Yugoslavia, and in the
way in which it was to finally break up. It is unlikely that Yugosla-
via would have been created and that it would have broken up so
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tragically if there had not been so many Serbs on the other side
of the Drina River. As demonstrated by the Serbs' "life-and-
death" struggle to preserve it, the integrity of Yugoslavia was also
in their national interest, despite the fact that many Serbs are
convinced that their forefathers decided on a common state first
and foremost out of generosity to their Southern Slav brothers.
It is self-evident that the Serbs' right to state self-determina-
tion in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina cannotjustify war crimes
and robbery; the torturing and killing of prisoners; rape; or "eth-
nic cleansing" - acts which, incidentally, the other two warring
sides have also committed. Not even in a civil war are people
allowed to do absolutely everything they want, although in a civil
war it is undoubtedly far more difficult to control the partici-
pants, comprised partially of paramilitary groups, people seeking
revenge, criminals, foreign fanatics, mercenaries, and psycho-
paths, than is the case in a war between states.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
Analysts of the Yugoslav tragedy do not devote sufficient at-
tention to the fact that since the beginning of the break-up of
Yugoslavia, a war for control over the YA has been waged. Even
less attention has been paid to the fact that the YA was a factor
sui generis that was waging war for its own survival, a survival that
depended increasingly on Serbia and Montenegro, as well as on
Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This struggle was
also fought to ensure the integrity of state territories to which YA
members and their families could withdraw from hostile and se-
ceded regions. The extent to which this struggle was decisive is
shown by the case of Macedonia, where not a single bullet was
fired because the secessionist authorities agreed to the YA with-
drawing peacefully to Serbia and Montenegro.
If we consider the YA in isolation from other state institu-
tions, we can freely say that it did not have any major confederal
characteristics. The Yugoslav Republics and Provinces, and the
Communist Party organizations governing these federal units,
had nothing to do with the YA's organization, functioning, and
system of command. The YA had its own Communist Party or-
ganization formally subordinated only to the federal Communist
Party leadership. This is one reason the YA not only broke up
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later than other federal institutions, including the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia, but did so in an entirely different way.
Recognizing these facts about the YA, after Tito's death the
separatists did everything in their power to bring about the YA's
confederalization. Slovene circles became "prominent" once
again, and they demanded that Slovene and Macedonian, in ad-
dition to Serbo-Croatian, be introduced into the YA as languages
of command; that recruits should perform their military service
in their own republics and autonomous provinces exclusively;
that strict national parity should be practiced in the officer
corps; and, finally, that the massive territorial defense, which the
YA had organized, trained, and armed, should be placed under
the sole authority of republican and provincial bodies, which in
any case already had sovereign authority over huge police forces.
While the separatists attacked the fact that the YA did not
have major confederal characteristics as evidence of Serb domi-
nation, the facts are as follows:
(1) At the time of the proclamation of the independence of
Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991, the composition
of the YA taken altogether - recruits, officers, and civilians
- was as follows: Serbs - 32.9%, Croats - 17.5%, Muslims -
13.4%, Albanians - 10.4%, Yugoslavs - 9.7%, Macedonians -
6.9%, Slovenes - 5.4%, Hungarians - 1.3%, etc.
(2) To serve as a comparison, the following are the results of
the census of the SFRY population in 1981: Serbs - 36.31%,
Croats - 19.75%, Muslims - 8.92%, Slovenes - 7.82%,
Macedonians - 5.98%, and others (Yugoslavs, Hungarians,
etc.) - 18.64%.
(3) It is also important to note that at the time of the seces-
sion of Slovenia and Croatia, by far the greater number of
their recruits (93% of Slovenes and 77% of Croats) were ful-
filling their military service on the territories of those Repub-
lics.
(4) At that time, the ten most important positions in the Min-
istry of Defense, the General Staff of the YA and the military
district commands, the Airforce, and the Navy were held by:
one Yugoslav (the minister of defense with a Serb father and
a Croat mother), three Serbs (the head of the General Staff,
the commander of the Skopje military district, and the naval
commander), two Croats (the assistant minister for the rear
and the airforce commander), two Slovenes (the Deputy De-
fense Minister and the commander of the Zagreb military dis-
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trict that covered the territory of Slovenia and Croatia), and
two Macedonians (the commander of the Belgrade military
district and the head of a department in the General Staff).
(5) It might be useful as well to recall that at the time of the
break-up of the SFRY its President, Prime Minister, and For-
eign Minister were Croats.
I do not have the data for officers possessing ranks below
the rank of general, but I assume that Serbs were by far the most
numerous, doubtless an important factor in the outcome of the
break-up of the SFRY. After all, Serbs accounted for nearly 40%
of the population; took proportionally greater part in the Peo-
ple's Liberation Struggle in the Second World War, a position
which they passed on to their children in the choice of profes-
sion; and, furthermore, the military tradition and the renown of
the warrior is greater among Serbs. Nevertheless, even when all
this is taken into account, it is still not clear why and how Slove-
nia and Croatia, after their separation from the SFRY, "man-
aged" to obtain only a small part of the airforce and navy, those
specialized branches of the ,YA in which national composition
and tradition went in their favor at least as much as it did in that
of the Serbs.
In advancing their ambitions, the confederalists-separatists
first relied on the fact that the eight-member SFRY presidency,la
according to the Constitution, made decisions by simple major-
ity, as the collective commander-in-chief of the YA. Those state-
breakers had previously wholeheartedly supported Serbia's de
facto partition into three parts. This weakness of Serbia was to
turn into its advantage as soon as Serbia succeeded in imposing
compliant leaderships on its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo
and Vojvodina, thereby also changing the ratio of forces in the
SFRY presidency. While up to that time the majority had out-
voted Serbia, there occurred a stalemate position (4:4) on the
issue of introducing confederal changes in the YA. Significantly,
there was no majority for proclaiming a state of emergency to
thwart the secessionists.
The YA was a Yugoslav-communist oriented army that fol-
lowed Tito unconditionally, and after his death transferred its
loyalty to the Constitution and the collective commander-in-
13. The presidency was comprised of representatives of the six Republics and the
two autonomous provinces.
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chief. Not only were Serbs thus disposed in the YA, but many
others were as well. That army was not politically, psychologi-
cally, morally, or professionally prepared for war among Yugo-
slav nations, but for the defense of the country against an exter-
nal enemy. Few of the key military officers were willing to make
use of all available resources against the secessionist republics,
especially without the consent of the SFRY presidency. The YA
did not, of course, have to seek its permission to defend itself
when the secessionists began to surround and attack its gar-
risons. Some people, especially among Serbs, condemn the YA
for not preventing the break-up of the SFRY. But was it really
worthwhile keeping any nation in Yugoslavia by force? What
kind of a state would that have been, and how long would it have
lasted? I even consider that the YA made a mistake when it
agreed to intervene in Slovenia and that it would have been far
better if it had warned that it would immediately withdraw from
that Republic if it was not allowed to reestablish federal control
on the Yugoslav border in a peaceful way.
When the secessionist Republics of Slovenia and Croatia
withdrew their representatives from the Presidency of the SFRY,
followed by the withdrawal of representatives of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina and Macedonia, the YA continued to implement the deci-
sions of the diminished, four-member presidency that continued
to pass decisions, now upon the instructions of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro.
The separatists conducted a counterproductive policy to-
wards the YA. They called too early on their compatriots to re-
fuse to do their military service, and on officers and soldiers in
the YA to dessert. They then started to surround and attack the
YA barracks and mistreat officers' families. During that time, the
Serbs cooperated fully with the YA. The secessionists' policy, as
illustrated in these events, stands as an excellent example of a
self-fulfilling accusation against the Serbian domination in the
YA.
In the first phase of the break-up of the SFRY, the YA de-
fended the territorial integrity of the State and itself. When the
Serbs took up arms to oppose the secessionist authorities, first in
Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the YA for some time
did actually come between the conflicting sides, which de facto
favored the Serbs. As the breakup of the SFRY progressed ever
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more, the YA became irrevocably Serb due to its national compo-
sition and consciousness.
V. INTENTIONS, ELEMENTAL POWERS, AD
CIRCUMSTANCES
There is a great deal of rashness, simplification, lack of ob-
jectivity, and evil intent in the interpretation of the Yugoslav ca-
tastrophe among both foreign and domestic commentators. In-
stead of entering into a complex analysis of causes and intents,
there is usually mention of one or two factors. Some overaccen-
tuate the importance of the leaders and their inter-activity, while
others claim that the violent break-up of SFRY was inevitable.
There are many who put the main blame on foreign countries.
There are also a number of commentators who do not see any
major foreign interference.
It is heard frequently that the main cause of the secession of
Croatia, and of other republics, should be sought in Slobodan
Milogevi 's inflexibility. Not only is this inaccurate, it is insulting
to the Croat nation if the protracted and deep-seated separatism
in their ranks is in the final account to be interpreted as result-
ing from the conduct of Serbs. This is particularly true in light
of the fact that Milosevic was a newcomer on the Yugoslav polit-
ical scene. He was nowhere in sight when the mass movement
rose up in Croatia nearly a quarter of a century ago, a movement
in which Franjo Tudjman played a role that was to ensure him
future incontestable leadership in Croatia's secession from the
SFRY.
The allegation is widely heard that Yugoslavia would not
have broken up, and certainly not so drastically, if Milogevi had
accepted Croatia's and Slovenia's offer on complete confederal
reorganization. But, what is a confederation if it is not an alli-
ance of independent states that maintain sovereignty over their
own territories and can withdraw from it at any time? Even if he
had wanted to, Milosevic would not have had the power to im-
pose such a solution, especially on the YA.
As we are speaking of leaders, why should a Milan Kucan,
and especially an Alija Izetbegovi , be neglected? There is no
doubt that Kucan's leadership in Slovenia blazed the trail in sep-
aratism. How did Izetbegovi succeed in presenting himself to
the world as a fighter for civic democracy, and not for Muslim
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rule? As the author of THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION, 14 for which he
was imprisoned under the communists, Izetbegovi was not ac-
ceptable to the Serbs and Croats. He wrote in that text, and he
has never renounced, the following: "The first and the most im-
portant of these conclusions is certainly the one on the incom-
patibility of Islam and non-Islamic orders. There can be neither
peace nor coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic
social institutions"; and, "[t]he Islamic movement can and
should take over power as soon as it becomes morally and nu-
merically strong enough-not only to destroy non-Islamic rule
but also to create a new Muslim rule." Could there be greater
proof of Izetbegovi 's Muslim fundamentalism? In my opinion,
his option, together with the Croats, to outvote the Serbs in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina was even more fatal, although he well knew that
despite the contribution of some Muslims to the People's Libera-
tion Struggle the Serbs still had vivid memories of Muslim partic-
ipation in Ustashi genocide and of the Muslim SS "Handzar" di-
vision during World War II. Why, then, does he wonder out
loud at the renewed outbreak of so much evil among the in-
habitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992?
The politically naive who adhere to the myth, which Tito
shared, concerning an "internationalist people" and "nationalist
leaders" are still large in number. It is high time to face the
bitter truth: powerful national and nationalist, and in the major-
ity also secessionist, movements developed in the Republics of
the SFRY, movements that we cannot understand if we overesti-
mate the extent to which leaders can animate and manipulate
"the common man." Horizontal conflicts among nations have
erupted in Yugoslavia, not a vertical rebellion against power
holders. It is true, however, that the mass of the population had
such a low level of political experience and political culture that
they quickly succumbed to radically nationalistic and separatist
influences. This does not, of course, mean that the role of na-
14. For his national and nationalistic activities Alija Izetbegovie was twice impris-
oned under Tito. His text, THE IsLAMIc DECLARATION, was circulated secretly in 1970
and published legally in 1990 in Sarajevo. That year, he became leader of the Muslim
political movement, the Democratic Action Party, and President of the collective presi-
dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the presidency's members was Radovan
Karadii, who was later elected President of the Serbian Republic that separated from
Bosnia-Herzegovina when it separated from Yugoslavia. In 1992, when Bosnia-Herzego-
vina declared independence from Yugoslavia under Izetbegovie's leadership, he was
elected President of the collective presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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tionalist leaders can or should be negated, but only that their
influence is not comprehensible without historical factors of
"long duration," favorable domestic and international circum-
stances, and the support of their nations.
National and state communities know little of their own de-
structive and self-destructive potential until circumstances are
ripe for it to show itself. After Tito, and especially after the fall
of communism in Eastern Europe and the first signs that the
Soviet Union itself was disintegrating, hitherto suppressed na-
tionalities' ambitions and energies came to the fore. The break-
up of the Soviet Union, one of the most powerful empires in
history, can help us to weigh various factors at work in the break-
up of the SFRY and to test the claim that the SFRY could have
been preserved only if its leaders had wanted to do so. The
enormous violence that has taken place could probably have
been avoided if we had had statesmen of international caliber at
our head, and not provincial functionaries. But there was no
room for such figures in the shadow of the charismarch 5 Tito.
In a state entity such as the SFRY, ridden by a history of
inter-nationality problems, conflicts, and extermination, when
mass movements erupt that violate the hitherto-governing rules
of the game and even consciously break up the state, it is no
wonder that chaos ensues. The philosophical description of a
war of "everyone against everyone" in a "natural state" is not,
here, very far from the truth. Philosophers who speak of the
"natural character" of the historical process could point to what
is happening in Yugoslavia today as an illustration and argu-
ment. An avalanche of fear, panic, fury, and revenge has de-
stroyed the connective tissue in the SFRY.
VI. WESTERN TRIUMPHALISM AND THE YUGOSLAV
TRAGEDY
The sudden and harsh eruption of nationalisms, chauvin-
isms, and separatisms in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the
1990's took Western politicians, intellectuals, and mass media by
surprise, as it did us in Yugoslavia. It is almost as if everyone had
taken Tito's propaganda about the final solution of the national-
ities question in Yugoslavia at face value.
15. This term originates with the author, and is used in scholarly texts concerning
Yugoslavia. Its meaning is analogous to "monarch."
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Following temporary support for the Yugoslav Government
of Ante Markovic,16 which believed that by means of market-ori-
ented economic reforms it would be possible to eliminate the
paralysis of the federal government, prevent the disintegration
of the country, and bring about its integration into the Euro-
pean community, the West briefly played the role of a neutral
mediator between the opposing Yugoslav Republics and their
leaders. The final result, however, was the active support of the
break-up of Yugoslavia.
By stirring up nationalisms, chauvinisms, and separatisms
throughout the world, the Third Communist International tried
to break up capitalist states. Capitalism later turned that weapon
against communism. In fact, due to successful resistance against
Soviet hegemonism, Yugoslavia was for a long time considered
an exception by the West in that regard. Nevertheless, as soon as
the Soviet Union began to fall apart, Yugoslavia became no
longer useful to the West. Consequently, here, too, the West
showed disregard for the Helsinki Accords17 that guaranteed ex-
isting state borders within Europe.
In an imaginary world of equal rights, the official Western
characterization of the break up of Yugoslavia would have been
construed as only one among several competing persuasive defi-
nitions, and would not have been taken as a sui generis factual
statement, much less a "divine utterance" creating facts. But in
the world such as it is, the Western fiat was sufficient for Slove-
nia's and Croatia's, and, then, for Bosnia-Herzegovina's, unilat-
eral secessions to be proclaimed the "democratic outcome of the
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
The West recognized the breakaway Republics as sovereign states,
while it defined the anti-secessionist intervention on the part of
16. Ante Markovic was a reform communist in Croatia, who became Prime Minis-
ter of Yugoslavia in 1988. His political career came to an end some time after Slovenia
and Croatia became independent states.
17. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter The Helsinki Accords]. The Helsinki Accords was
agreed to on August 1, 1975 by the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany,
Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Yugoslavia.
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the remnants of the Yugoslav Government, the YA, Serbia, and
Montenegro, as "aggressors."
The West acted in the same manner with regard to the war
between Serbs and Croats in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia,
and later with regard to the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina be-
tween the Serbs on the one hand and the Slavic Muslims and
Croats on the other. The West decided not to treat these wars as
civil wars inside Yugoslavia, but rather as "defensive wars" of Cro-
atia and Bosnia-Herzegovina against "external attack." Accord-
ingly, the participation of regular military units from Croatia in
the war inside Bosnia-Herzegovina has been tacitly approved as
the allegedly legitimate military cooperation of two sovereign
states or, at the least, as the establishment of a Muslim-Croat mil-
itary balance vis-A-vis the Bosnian Serbs and their, allies in the YA,
Serbia, and Montenegro.
Nonetheless, prior to the outbreak of armed conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, even were we to suppose that the West,
through the "preventive" recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on
April 6, 1992, produced a quasi-legal international basis for its
characterization of that war, the same could in no way be applied
to the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, since those broke out six
months prior to the recognition of these Yugoslav Republics as
independent states in December and January of 1990-91. Actu-
ally, all these have been wars literally among the citizens of an
internationally recognized state: the SFRY.
Naturally, the definition of our wars as civil could not and
would not conceptually prevent anyone from denouncing the
warring sides and their allies. The West, however, did not want
to accuse Serbia, Montenegro, and the YA merely of aiding the
Serb faction in the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
since the West itself had intervened countless times in civil wars
far and wide. Moreover, the Muslim and Croat sides have also
received military and other aid elsewhere, even from very distant
countries. Finally, that definition itself could not have provided
a sufficient legal-international basis for the imposition of a trade
blockade and other sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.
Rather than putting the Western Governments on their
guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the war in Croatia prompted the
West to go so far as to recognize the secession of Bosnia-Herze-
govina from Yugoslavia as well. The Western Governments have
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even sought to impose a unitary state arrangement on the Bos-
nia-Herzegovina Serbs and Croats. 18
Aside from those mentioned above, other important contra-
dictions in which the West has become entangled in its support
for dividing up Yugoslavia should be noted:
A) The West has violated the principle that state bound-
aries can be changed solely by way of agreement, not unilater-
ally or by means of force. The first step down that unprinci-
pled path was made by promoting the notion of "internal bor-
ders," a concept that international law does not cover or
recognize. The second step was putting such internal borders
on a par with "external borders," the only borders that are
covered and recognized under international law. The final
step was giving priority to the former over the latter. The
world is somehow asked to believe that international law is
not violated by those who have unilaterally seceded from Yu-
goslavia, nor by the West that has supported them, but rather
by those who have opposed their secession.
B) The secessions from Yugoslavia were recognized as
the expression of the right of nations to self-determination,
but, in practice, this was interpreted as the "right" of entire
territorial units of Yugoslavia, i.e., republics, to separate from the
state of which they were composite parts. It is well known,
however, that such a "right" does not exist. The United Na-
tions has recognized only the exclusive right of nations to self-
determination, and this only when they are resisting foreign
occupation, colonial government, or apartheid - which, in
any event, was not the case in Yugoslavia.
C) The right to self-determination was recognized with
respect to the Slovenes, the Croats, the Slavic Muslims, and
the Macedonians, yet denied to the Serbs in those territories
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Serbs constitute
a majority. Self-determination was deliberately interpreted as
the right to secede from Yugoslavia, but not as the right to
remain part of it.
D) The West has, after decades of support for Yugoslav
communism, rejected it as illegitimate, but has insisted that
the internal territorial divisions of the communist Yugoslavia
be transformed into international borders. Yugoslavia was
18. One is flabbergasted that it could have even occurred to Western Governments
that Bosnia-Herzegovina could become a unitary state, when federal-confederal Yugo-
slavia was unable to survive as Bosnia-Herzegovina's state framework.
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not, however, consistently divided into republics according to
national or historical criteria. Instead, the Yugoslav commu-
nist party state was made to reflect the organizational struc-
ture of the CPY as a state party. Tito himself, on the occasion
of the introduction of these administrative divisions in 1945,
declared, and subsequently repeated several times, that they
were not genuine borders. Since the Politburo of the CPY
implemented these divisions dictatorially following the Sec-
ond World War, one cannot escape the impression that the
West supported the principle of self-determination in 1991-
92, but only on condition that the results of the original, fun-
damental, non-self-determination be respected.
The apologists of Western policy point to the fact that
such territorial divisions were constitutionally ordained in Yu-
goslavia. Yet, they keep silent about the factthat, in keeping
with that same Constitution of 1974, no federal law could be
adopted without the consent of all the Republics, a principle
that is particularly important vis-a-vis the eventual decision of
any republic to secede from the common state. After all, in
any country in the world the secession of any part thereof
without an agreement between the central government and
the remaining constituent parts represents casus belli.
E) The European Union initiated its diplomatic-political
intervention in Yugoslavia's internal disputes promising im-
partial good services to all sides, but it was quick to start im-
posing secessionist solutions. The members of the European
Union, for example, did not punish Slovenia. They instead
recognized it as a sovereign state, although that recognition
represented a violation of Slovenia's obligation to the Euro-
pean Union undertaken in the summer of 1991, that it allow
on its borders the Yugoslavian army, police, passport, and cus-
toms control.
The European Union formed an arbitration commission of
lawyers, the so-called Badinter Commission, to set up the legal
pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. But
when that commission proposed the recognition of Macedonia
and not that of Croatia, the European Union, pressured by Ger-
many, acted to the contrary. By recognizing Croatia and, some-
what later, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union violated
the Montevideo Convention of 1932, which conditions the rec-
ognition of a state on the existence of an effective central gov-
ernment, total territorial control by that government, and a
clearly defined populace.
1995]
360 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:337
The break-up of a state like Yugoslavia hardly represented
so insignificant an international danger that the West should
have dared to act with such a lack of prudence and principle,
particularly when by so doing, they also expunged the results of
two world wars. History usually punishes such arrogance.
The United States and other Western countries have actively
supported the emergence of six new small states from the six
Yugoslav republics. I was present when, at the beginning of
March 1992, at the Institute of International Politics and Eco-
nomics in Belgrade, the then-American Ambassador, Warren
Zimmerman, openly presented that plan. The two of us argued
a little on that occasion, and the Ambassador finally "conceded"
somewhat, acknowledging that Serbia and Montenegro could re-
main in a unified federal state, though by no means in the role
of a successor to the SFRY.
The U.S. Administration has failed to sufficiently take into
account that the manner in which a state was founded is bound
to exert significant influence over the manner of its eventual dis-
solution. Since Yugoslavia was not created in 1918 by the linking
of the six territorial-political entities alluded to above, it was not
realistic to expect that it would break up precisely along those
lines.
With regard to the U.S. policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, I
must again mention Ambassador Zimmerman.19 When I asked
him what the next U.S. move in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be,
the Ambassador answered that the West would recognize it as an
independent state on April 6, 1992. I replied that the conse-
quences would be very serious since the local nationalities had
not resolved a single essential issue. I added that I saw a chance
for a peaceful settlement only in some type of cantonization or
confederalization. I also cautioned that Alija Izetbegovic, em-
boldened by any such recognition, would probably withdraw his
agreement to the recently attained Lisbon Accord"0 regarding a
tripartite cantonization and that the Serbs would, in response,
take up arms in fear for their own survival - not merely in the
19. Ambassador Zimmerman gave a dinner party in Belgrade for my wife and me,
along with one other couple, three weeks after the encounter with him just described.
20. On February 23, 1993 in Lisbon, Alija Izetbegovic in the name of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Muslims, Radovan Karadfit in the name of the Serbs, and Mate Boban in
the name of the Croats endorsed a plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina to poetically become a
confederation of the three nationality groups and their state entities.
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name of national self-determination. With respect to the Croats,
I stated that they would continue supporting the Muslims, but
only tactically and temporarily. I reminded him that on April 6,
1941, Hitler began his punishment of the Serbs by means of the
barbaric bombing of Belgrade and the all-out attack on Yugosla-
via. For that reason, the greatest possible insult that the United
States could convey to the Serbs would be to choose precisely
that date for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1 I also ex-
plained that on April 10, 1941, the Nazi puppet state of Paveli
was set up in Croatia, to which was subsequently incorporated
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the anti-Serb genocidal collabora-
tion of Croat and Muslim Ustashis occurred. Zimmerman didn't
agree with my "pessimism," convinced that the West, through an
"authoritative recognition" of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would avert
war among the nationalities there.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is highly unlikely that Yugoslavia could have been saved.
This is primarily due to the internal reasons I have outlined.
Since the SFRY was not the victim of external attack, occupation,
and dismemberment, as was the case with the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia in 1941, it is fitting to search for the main reasons for the
present-day destruction, exactly fifty years later, within Yugosla-
via itself.
The principal Yugoslav fissures did not follow the "bounda-
ries" between the Republics that the "international community"
sought to impose as international borders. They followed the
lines that divide nationalities, religions, cultures, histories, and
civilizations. Consequently, the list of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the tragic disintegration of Yugoslavia cannot ex-
clude the catastrophic omissions and errors of the most powerful
foreign nations. The break-up of the SFRY did not have to be
bloody, at least not as bloody as it turned out to be, and it proba-
bly would not have been had the international community acted
more cautiously, more objectively, more constructively, and
more wisely.
If Yugoslavia as a whole had been linked in a constructive
manner to Western European integration, the tragedy of war
21. As if to spite the Serbs, that recognition was declared on April 6, 1992.
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could probably have been averted. In the mid-1980's, the SFRY
expressed the desire to become an associate member of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, but this was never seriously taken
into consideration. Several years later Slovenia and Croatia
would come to believe that that Community could hardly wait to
have them as members as soon as they declared their indepen-
dence. That illusion played an important role in their effort to
secede, suddenly and at any price, from Yugoslavia.
The West has expressed: ample understanding of the pres-
ence of the former Soviet central military in some of the former
republics of the Soviet Union; patience with its gradual with-
drawal from the breakaway Baltic republics; and even patience
with the Soviets' several-year-long pullout from Eastern Ger-
many. Why, then, did the same Western countries pressure the
Yugoslav Army to withdraw instantly, and at any price, from the
separatist republics of Yugoslavia? As a matter of fact, did not
the West thereby encourage separatist republics to lay siege to
and attack the garrisons of the YA, and bring about an increase
in human victims and material destruction? Attaining their
agreement with the YA on the unhindered relocation of its per-
sonnel and armaments from its territory, Macedonia showed
how it was possible to avoid bloodletting on the occasion of Yu-
goslavia's collapse.
As soon as the first symptoms of the Yugoslav state crisis and
collapse became apparent, the United Nations and not the Euro-
pean Union should have called a conference on Yugoslavia, with
the task of defining the rules for the Yugoslav republics' peace-
fully seceding from the state, as well as for peacefully remaining
within it. The leaderships of Yugoslavia's republics should have
been informed that they would not be granted international rec-
ognition (preventive non-recognition) unless they first reached a
mutual agreement, and that U.N. sanctions would be applied
against those that attempted a policy of fait accompli. It is self-
evident that the fate of the YA would have had to occupy the
central place in that inter-nationality accord. When such a con-
ference was not convened'prior to armed conflicts in Slovenia
and Croatia, why was it not organized to at least prevent the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
